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Engine MRO Supply Chain Under Strain: What IATA's 2026 Report Means for Parts Buyers

Jul 6, 2026

Engine MRO Supply Chain Under Strain: What IATA's 2026 Report Means for Parts Buyers

IATA's June 2026 study with Emerton flags spare-parts shortages, grounded jets, and constrained aftermarket access—what the engine MRO squeeze means for parts buyers, USM sourcing, and PMA access.

On June 24, 2026, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), working with consultancy Emerton, published a study warning that the engine MRO supply chain for the newest single-aisle jets is straining under demand it was never scaled to meet. The whitepaper—Single-aisle aircraft engines MRO: Strategic levers to address supply chain challenges—looks specifically at the two engine families that power most of today's narrowbody backlog: the LEAP from CFM International and the Geared Turbofan (GTF) from Pratt & Whitney. Its conclusion is blunt: without coordinated action, the bottlenecks that have already parked hundreds of aircraft could deepen as these fleets expand.

For airlines, that is an operational and financial problem. For the people who source, sell, and certify spare parts—distributors, MROs, and the buyers who keep maintenance lines fed—it is also a signal about where the market is heading. The report is less a warning about a single engine defect than a diagnosis of a structural squeeze: too many engines needing shop visits, too few spare parts and spare engines to go around, and too many barriers to the independent capacity that could absorb the overflow. This briefing summarizes what the study found and what it means for parts procurement.

What the IATA–Emerton study found

The headline data point is a fleet-availability number. According to the study, the count of grounded Pratt & Whitney GTF-powered aircraft peaked in March 2025 at 648 aircraft—about 28% of the GTF fleet—all waiting on engine shop visits, spare engines, or parts. That is not a rounding error in a global fleet; it is more than a quarter of a modern engine program sitting idle at once. Operators absorbed the hit the only ways they could: retaining older aircraft they had planned to retire, extending or adding leases, and trimming planned capacity.

The forward-looking numbers explain why IATA calls the situation structural rather than transient. Annual engine shop visits are forecast to climb steeply as the in-service fleets mature. For the LEAP, the study projects roughly 600 to 800 shop visits a year in 2025 rising to more than 5,000 by 2040. For the GTF, the forecast runs from around 1,000 to more than 2,000 over the same period. Shop-visit demand on that trajectory collides with a repair network, a spare-parts pipeline, and a spare-engine pool that are all already tight.

Several drivers compound the problem. Newer-generation engines were designed for fuel efficiency, and some have shown durability issues that bring them in for maintenance sooner—reducing time on wing and raising the number of visits per engine over its life. Each of those visits consumes parts, and when parts are scarce, engines wait. Limited spare-engine availability means an airline cannot simply hang a replacement while the original is in the shop. And constrained access to the aftermarket—parts, repair data, and tooling—limits how much independent capacity can be brought online to relieve the OEM-controlled network. The result is longer turnaround times and more complex maintenance planning for airlines that would rather be flying the metal.

Why the engine MRO supply chain is the choke point

It is worth being precise about where the pressure sits. The bottleneck the report describes is not primarily a shortage of airframes or of qualified technicians, though both matter elsewhere. It is a parts-and-repair bottleneck concentrated in the engine MRO supply chain: the flow of serviceable components, the availability of approved repairs that keep parts in service instead of scrapping them, and the ability of shops outside the OEM's own network to do the work.

Two concepts from the study are worth defining because they recur in any serious discussion of parts availability. The first is used serviceable material (USM)—components recovered from engine and aircraft teardowns, inspected, and returned to service with the appropriate airworthiness paperwork. USM extends the effective parts pool without waiting on new production, and it is a mainstay of independent maintenance economics. The second is the family of approved alternative parts and repairs: in the United States, Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) parts produced under FAA oversight, and repairs developed through Designated Engineering Representative (DER) processes; in Europe, the equivalent approvals under EASA's Part-21 framework. These regulator-certified alternatives exist precisely so that a new part from the original manufacturer is not the only lawful path back to airworthiness.

The study's framing is that the industry is not making full use of these levers. Repair solutions that could keep expensive parts in service—rather than scrapping them and ordering new—are slow to develop and approve, so scrap rates stay high and demand for new parts stays elevated. Licensed production of critical components is narrower than demand warrants. And access to USM, repair information, and tooling is uneven, which limits how much work independent MROs can take on. Each of those is a place where more parts, or more repairs, could reach the network—if the barriers came down.

IATA's four levers—and what they signal for sourcing

The report does not stop at diagnosis; it proposes a set of coordinated actions. Paraphrased, the four levers are:

  1. Increase engine parts availability. Accelerate the development and regulatory approval of repair solutions to reduce scrap rates, expand licensed production of critical components, and widen access to used serviceable material recovered from teardowns.
  2. Ensure fair access to the MRO market. Remove barriers that limit independent MRO participation, and provide fair access to the parts, repair information, and tooling needed to build additional capacity. IATA points to its agreement with CFM—first signed in 2018 and renewed in January 2026—as a good-practice model supporting customer choice, regulator-approved non-OEM parts and repairs, and fair access for third-party MRO providers.
  3. Secure long-term access to spare parts. Build provisions into aircraft and engine acquisition decisions that lock in predictable spare-parts pricing and availability, including protections airlines can assign to the MRO providers they choose.
  4. Adopt competitive aftermarket principles. IATA calls on OEMs across engines, airframes, and components to embrace transparent, competitive aftermarket practices that support customer choice and the use of regulator-certified alternative parts and repairs.

Read together, these levers point in a consistent direction: a wider, more competitive parts and repair market, with more USM, more approved alternatives, and more independent capacity. For buyers, that is both an opportunity and a responsibility. A broader sourcing landscape means more places to find a part when the OEM channel is quoting long lead times—but it also means more documentation to verify and more diligence at the point of purchase.

What it means for parts buyers, MROs, and distributors

For procurement teams, the practical takeaways are less about the macro forecast and more about how to operate inside a tight market without cutting corners.

Widen the sourcing map, but keep the paperwork tight. As airlines and MROs lean harder on USM and approved alternative parts to bridge shortages, the volume of transactions outside the original-equipment channel rises. That is exactly where traceability discipline earns its keep. A USM component is only as good as its trace and its release documentation—an FAA Form 8130-3 or EASA Form 1 where applicable, teardown and removal records, and a clear chain of custody. Buyers should confirm which regulatory basis a part is being offered under (new, OEM overhauled, PMA, or USM) and insist on the corresponding airworthiness paperwork before accepting it, rather than after.

Plan around turnaround, not just unit price. The report's core message is that the constraint is time as much as cost. When shop-visit demand outstrips capacity, the scarce resource is a serviceable part available now. Sourcing strategies that widen the supplier base—drawing on multiple distributors and supplier-direct fulfillment rather than a single channel—reduce the risk of a single lead-time quote grounding an aircraft.

Treat compliance screening as part of sourcing, not a hurdle after it. A broader, more global parts market raises the stakes on knowing who the end user is and where a part is going. Export-control and sanctions screening—end-user statement review, destination and party checks against the relevant regulators—belongs early in the transaction, not bolted on at the end. None of this substitutes for official guidance: for definitions and current requirements, buyers should work from primary sources such as the FAA and EASA on airworthiness and approvals, and the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on export controls and sanctions.

This is the environment Western Spark works in every day. As a Washington-based reseller operating a dropship model with supplier-direct fulfillment and end-user and sanctions screening on every order, we help buyers navigate a widening sourcing landscape without loosening the documentation and compliance standards that keep parts airworthy and transactions clean. If a tight engine MRO supply chain is stretching your lead times, we are glad to help you source against it—properly documented, and properly screened.

Conclusion

The IATA–Emerton study is a useful marker for anyone in aircraft parts procurement: it names the choke point in the engine MRO supply chain, quantifies how many aircraft it has already parked, and lays out the levers—more USM, more approved alternatives, fairer access to independent MRO, and long-term parts-access provisions—that could ease it. For buyers, the message is not to wait for the market to fix itself but to build sourcing and compliance practices that work in a scarce, competitive aftermarket. The parts will increasingly come from more places; the discipline around trace, approval, and screening is what keeps that breadth from becoming a liability.

References

Disclaimer: This article is provided for general informational and editorial purposes only and does not constitute legal, regulatory, airworthiness, export-control, or other professional advice, and no reader should rely on it as such. Western Spark LLC makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of this content and accepts no liability for any errors, omissions, or for any action taken in reliance on it. Regulatory identifiers, effectivity, dates, and requirements change and may contain inaccuracies; always verify against the primary sources (for example, the FAA, EASA, the relevant OEM, BIS, or OFAC) and consult a qualified professional before acting.